Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is a form of public-key encryption that allows the computation of arbitrary functions on encrypted data without decrypting the data. As a result, it is a useful tool with numerous applications. Certificateless encryption (CLE) is a type of public-key encryption that combines the advantages of PKI-based public-key encryption with those of identity-based encryption (IBE). Thus, certificateless fully homomorphic encryption (CLFHE) has aroused considerable research interest. Recently, Chen, Hu, and Lian proposed a leveled certificateless homomorphic encryption (CLHE) scheme and proved its semantic security based on the learning with errors (LWE) problem in the random oracle model. However, their scheme supports only homomorphic addition, but not homomorphic multiplication. In this work, we construct two leveled CLFHE schemes using the approximate eigenvector method presented by Gentry, Sahai, and Waters. Based on the hardness of the LWE problem, we prove that one scheme satisfies adaptive semantic security and anonymity in the random oracle model, whereas the other satisfies selective semantic security and anonymity in the standard model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [1] , [2] is a variant of public-key encryption. It allows anyone to perform arbitrary computation on encrypted data. Hence, it is a useful tool with a number of attractive applications, such as private outsourcing of computation, privacy-preserving machine learning, and secure multiparty computation. Leveled FHE is a special variant of FHE. In a leveled FHE scheme, the system parameters may depend on the depth of the circuits that the system can evaluate. In 2013, Gentry, Sahai and Waters [3] (GSW) proposed a new technique for building FHE schemes of so-called approximate eigenvector method, and accordingly constructed a leveled FHE scheme based on the learning with errors (LWE) problem [4] . In the GSW scheme, the homomorphic evaluator does not need to obtain the user's evaluation key. Alperin-Sheriff and Peikert [5] subsequently
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jiafeng Xie. provided a technically simpler variant of the GSW scheme by utilizing a gadget matrix G developed in [6] .
Certificateless encryption (CLE) [7] is also a variant of public-key encryption. In a CLE scheme, a semi-trusted third party, referred to as the key generation center (KGC), calculates partial private keys for users in the system according to their identities. In this way, the CLE removes the need to distribute digital certificates. Moreover, a user also generates a public/private key pair by itself. Since the private key of a user is not available to the KGC, the CLE does not suffer from the key escrow problem that is inherent in identity-based encryption (IBE) [8] , [9] . Consequently, CLE is public-key encryption with unique characteristics. Dent [10] , [11] provided a review of the syntax and security models for the CLE scheme. Recently, several CLE schemes based on the LWE problem have been proposed in the random oracle model [12] or standard model [13] .
Certificateless fully homomorphic encryption (CLFHE) has drawn considerable attention from researchers. In 2013, Guang, Gu, and Zhu [14] proposed a leveled CLFHE scheme VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ using the re-linearization technique presented in [15] and proved that it was semantically secure based on the hardness of the LWE problem in the random oracle model. However, their scheme incurs a very high computational complexity. Thus, Chen, Hu, and Lian [16] proposed a leveled certificateless homomorphic encryption (CLHE) scheme using the approximate eigenvector method presented in [3] and proved its semantic security based on the hardness of the LWE problem in the random oracle model. This scheme has a relatively lower time complexity in comparison with the scheme proposed by Guang et al. However, the scheme proposed by Chen et al. supports only homomorphic addition, but not homomorphic multiplication. Thus, constructing an efficient leveled CLFHE scheme is a problem that remains to be addressed.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this work, we focus on designing leveled CLFHE schemes. By utilizing the approximate eigenvector method [3] , a lot of leveled identity-based FHE schemes [17] - [20] have been proposed. Considering that the approximate eigenvector method can be used to eliminate a user's evaluation key, we adopt it to design leveled CLFHE schemes. The contributions of this work are as follows:
1) We propose a leveled CLFHE scheme in the random oracle model. Specifically, we first construct a leveled CLFHE scheme using the technically simpler GSW variant presented in [5] and the preimage sampling algorithm SamplePre presented in [21] . Next, we provide a parameter setting for the proposed CLFHE scheme. Finally, we prove that the proposed CLFHE scheme is semantically secure and anonymous for adaptive chosen-identity based on the hardness of the LWE problem in the random oracle model. 2) We remove the random oracles and propose a leveled CLFHE scheme in the standard model. We first construct a leveled CLFHE scheme using the technically simpler GSW variant presented in [5] and the Gaussian sampling algorithm SampleLeft presented in [22] . We then provide a parameter setting for the proposed CLFHE scheme. Finally, by exploiting the Gaussian sampling algorithm SampleRight presented in [22] , we prove that the proposed CLFHE scheme is semantically secure and anonymous for selective-identity based on the hardness of the LWE problem in the standard model.
B. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we give the preliminaries including notations, lattice backgrounds, and the LWE problem. We describe the syntax and security models for CLFHE schemes in Section III. In Section IV, we put forth a leveled CLFHE scheme based on the LWE problem in the random oracle model. In Section V, we put forward a leveled CLFHE scheme based on the LWE problem in the standard model.
Finally, we conclude and outline some future work in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. NOTATIONS
For a positive integer k, we let [k] = {1, . . . , k}. For an integer modulus q, we let Z q = (−q/2, q/2] ∩ Z. We treat vectors as column vectors and denote them with bold lowercase letters, e.g., x. We denote matrices with bold uppercase letters, e.g., X, and view a matrix X as the set {x i } of its column vectors. We denote by X the Gram-Schmidt ordered orthogonalization of a matrix X. We denote the Euclidean norm of a vector x by x . For a matrix X, the Euclidean norm of X is defined as X = max j x j . Hence, for an n×m matrix X and an n × m matrix Y, it holds that
Throughout this paper, we let λ denote a security parameter and negl(λ) denote a negligible function. The statistical distance between two random variables X and Y over a countable domain S is defined as ( 
be a matrix whose columns are linearly independent vectors b 1 , . . . , b m ∈ R m . The m-dimensional lattice generated by the basis B is defined as the set
Definition 2: For a positive integer q, a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and a vector u ∈ Z n q , define two m-dimensional integer lattices:
We observe that if x ∈ u q (A), then u q (A) = ⊥ q (A) + x, and hence u q (A) is a shift of ⊥ q (A). Proposition 1 ( [23] , [24] ): There is a PPT algorithm GenBasis (1 n , 1 m , q) that, for m ≥ 6n log q, outputs A ∈ Z n×m q and T ∈ Z m×m such that the distribution of A is statistically close to uniform over Z n×m q , T is a basis of ⊥ q (A), and T ≤ O( √ n log q).
2) GAUSSIANS ON LATTICES
Definition 3: For any vector c ∈ R m and real σ > 0, the Gaussian function on R m with center c and parameter σ is defined as
For any c ∈ R m , σ > 0, and m-dimensional lattice , the discrete Gaussian distribution over is defined as
The subscripts σ and c are taken as 1 and 0 when omitted. Proposition 2 ( [25] ): For any m-dimensional lattice , vector c ∈ R m , and reals 0 < < 1, σ ≥ η ( ), we have
where η ( ) is the smoothing parameter of and for any basis B of , η ( ) ≤ B · ω( √ log m). 2 , outputs a vector x ∈ Z 2m sampled from a distribution that is statistically close to D u q (A|AR+B),σ .
3) SAMPLING ALGORITHMS

C. THE LWE Problem
The LWE problem was introduced by Regev [4] . For positive integers n and q ≥ 2, a vector s ∈ Z n q , and a probability distribution χ over Z, define the LWE distribution A s,χ to be the distribution over Z n q × Z q obtained by choosing a vector a ← Z n q uniformly at random and an error term e ← χ, and outputting (a, b = a T · s + e mod q). The decisional LWE (DLWE) is defined as follows.
Definition 4: Let n = n(λ) be an integer dimension, let q = q(λ) ≥ 2 be an integer modulus, and let χ = χ (λ) be an error distribution over Z. The average-case DLWE n,q,χ problem is to distinguish between any desired number of samples (a i , b i ) ← A s,χ , and the same number of samples chosen from the uniform distribution over Z n q × Z q . The DLWE n,q,χ assumption is that the DLWE n,q,χ problem is infeasible.
There are reductions between the DLWE n,q,χ assumption and the standard lattice assumptions as follows. These reductions take the error distribution χ to be a discrete Gaussian distribution D Z,αq that has parameter αq for some α ∈ (0, 1). Proposition 6 ( [4] , [6] , [26] , [27] , Stated as Corollary 1 From [28] ): Let q = q(n) ∈ N be either a prime power or a product of small (size poly(n)) distinct primes, and let α ≥ 2 √ n/q. If there exists an efficient algorithm that solves the average-case DLWE n,q,D Z,αq problem, then:
• there exists an efficient quantum algorithm that solves GapSVPÕ (n/α) and SIVPÕ (n/α) in the worst-case for any n-dimensional lattices;
• if in addition q ≥Õ(2 n/2 ), then there exists an efficient classical algorithm that solves GapSVPÕ (n/α) in the worst-case for any n-dimensional lattices.
We extend the LWE distribution to w ≥ 1 secrets, defining A S,χ for S ∈ Z n×w q to be the distribution obtained by choosing a vector a ← Z n q and an error vector e ← χ w , and outputting
Clearly, distinguishing such samples from uniformly random is as hard as the DLWE n,q,χ problem. It is generally convenient to group many sample pairs together in matrices. We can thus express the DLWE n,q,χ problem as distinguish any desired number of sample pairs (A,
III. SYNTAX AND SECURITY MODELS FOR CLFHE A. SYNTAX DEFINITION
Dent [10] , [11] gave three formal definitions for CLE, namely, AP definition [7] , BSS definition [29] , and LK definition [30] . Using the BSS definition [29] in which a user cannot publish its public key until it has obtained a partial private key, we define a leveled CLFHE scheme CLFHE = (Setup, Extract, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Eval) as follows.
• Setup(1 λ , 1 L ): This algorithm is run by the KGC.
It takes as input a security parameter λ and a circuit depth L. It outputs a master public key mpk and a master private key msk.
• Extract(mpk, msk, id): This algorithm is run by the KGC. It takes as input a master public key mpk, a master private key msk, and an identity id ∈ ID, where ID is the identity space of the scheme. It outputs a partial private key psk id .
• KeyGen(mpk, id, psk id ): This algorithm takes as input a master public key mpk, an identity id, and a partial private key psk id . It outputs a public key pk id and a private key sk id .
• Encrypt(mpk, id, pk id , µ): This algorithm takes as input a master public key mpk, an identity id, a public key pk id , and a message µ ∈ M, where M is the message space of the scheme. It outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C, where C is the ciphertext space of the scheme. 
Compactness. A CLFHE scheme is compact if there exists a polynomial p(λ, L) such that
That is to say, the size of the evaluated ciphertext c f should be independent of f and , but can depend on λ and L.
Security. The security model for CLFHE is the same as that for CLE. There are two types of attackers, Type I attacker (denoted by A I ) and Type II attacker (denoted by A II ), for the CLE scheme. A Type I attacker acts as an outsider that can replace the public keys, whereas a Type II attacker acts as the KGC that cannot replace the public keys, but can access the master private key. According to the security models for CLE given by Dent [10] , [11] , we define the indistinguishability from random under an adaptive-identity chosen-plaintext attack (INDr-ID-CPA) model and the indistinguishability from random under a selective-identity chosen-plaintext attack (INDr-sID-CPA) model for CLFHE in the following two sections. The concept of the indistinguishability from random under a chosen-plaintext attack implies both semantic security and recipient anonymity. The selective-identity security is a weaker variant of the adaptive-identity security. In the selective-identity security model, the attacker must fix an identity it intends to attack before seeing the master public key.
B. ADAPTIVE-IDENTITY SECURITY MODEL FOR CLFHE
The INDr-ID-CPA security for CLFHE against Type I attacks is defined by the following game.
Setup: The challenger runs (mpk, msk) ← Setup(1 λ , 1 L ) and sends mpk to the attacker A I .
Phase 1: A I may adaptively make the following queries:
• Extract partial private key: If A I submits an identity id ∈ ID to the challenger, the challenger runs psk id ← Extract(mpk, msk, id) and returns the partial private key psk id to A I .
• Request public key: If A I submits an identity id ∈ ID to the challenger, the challenger runs (pk id , sk id ) ← KeyGen(mpk, id, psk id ) and psk id ← Extract(mpk, msk, id) (as necessary) and returns the public key pk id to A I . The challenger also stores the tuple (id, pk id , sk id ).
• Replace public key: If A I submits an identity id ∈ ID and a public key pk id to the challenger, the challenger replaces the public key of id with pk id and updates the corresponding information in the storage. Challenge: Once A I decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a target identity id * ∈ ID and a message µ ∈ M on which it wishes to be challenged. The challenger randomly chooses a bit b ← {0, 1} and a ciphertext c ← C. If b = 0, it sets the challenge ciphertext to c * 0 = Encrypt(mpk, id * , pk id * , µ), where pk id * can be the replaced public key pk id * . If b = 1, it sets the challenge ciphertext to c * 1 = c. The challenger sends c * b to A I . Phase 2: A I may continue to make the queries as described in Phase 1.
Guess: Finally, A I outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1}.
In the above game, A I is not allowed to replace the public key of id * in Phase 1 and request the partial private key of id * in Phase 1 or 2 because it can then compute a full private key for id * .
The attacker A I wins the game if b = b . We define the advantage of A I in attacking the CLFHE scheme as
The CLFHE scheme is considered INDr-ID-CPA secure against Type I attacks if Adv INDr−ID−CPA CLFHE,A I (λ) = negl(λ). The INDr-ID-CPA security for CLFHE against Type II attacks is defined by the following game.
Setup: The challenger runs (mpk, msk) ← Setup(1 λ , 1 L ) and sends mpk and msk to the attacker A II .
Phase 1: A II may adaptively make the following queries:
• Request public key: If A II submits an identity id ∈ ID and a partial private key psk id to the challenger, the challenger runs (pk id , sk id ) ← KeyGen(mpk, id, psk id ) and returns the public key pk id to A II . Challenge: A II outputs a target identity id * ∈ ID and a message µ ∈ M. The challenger picks a random bit b ← {0, 1} and a random ciphertext c ← C. If b = 0, it sets the challenge ciphertext to c * 0 = Encrypt(mpk, id * , pk id * , µ). If b = 1, it sets the challenge ciphertext to c * 1 = c. The challenger sends c * b to A II . Phase 2: A II may continue to make the queries as described in Phase 1.
Guess: A II outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1}.
The attacker A II wins the game if b = b . We define the advantage of A II in attacking the CLFHE scheme as
The CLFHE scheme is considered INDr-ID-CPA secure against Type II attacks if Adv INDr−ID−CPA CLFHE,A II (λ) = negl(λ).
C. SELECTIVE-IDENTITY SECURITY MODEL FOR CLFHE
The INDr-sID-CPA security for CLFHE against Type I attacks is defined by the following game. Init: The attacker A I outputs an identity id * ∈ ID on which it wishes to be challenged.
Setup: The challenger runs (mpk, msk) ← Setup(1 λ , 1 L ) and sends mpk to A I .
Phase 1: A I may adaptively make partial private key extraction, public key request, and public key replacement queries. The challenger responds to these queries as outlined in Section III-B.
Challenge: Once A I decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a message µ ∈ M on which it wishes to be challenged. The challenger randomly chooses a bit b ← {0, 1} and a ciphertext c ← C. If b = 0, it sets the challenge ciphertext to c * 0 = Encrypt(mpk, id * , pk id * , µ), where pk id * may be the replaced public key pk id * . If b = 1, it sets the challenge ciphertext to c * 1 = c. The challenger sends c * b to A I . Phase 2: A I may continue to make the queries as described in Phase 1.
In the above game, A I cannot replace the public key of id * in Phase 1 and request the partial private key of id * in Phase 1 or 2 because this would otherwise make it possible to compute the full private key for id * .
The CLFHE scheme is said to be INDr-sID-CPA secure against Type I attacks if Adv INDr−sID−CPA CLFHE,A I (λ) = negl(λ). The INDr-sID-CPA security for CLFHE against Type II attacks is defined by the following game.
Init: The attacker A II outputs an identity id * ∈ ID. Setup: The challenger runs (mpk, msk) ← Setup(1 λ , 1 L ) and sends mpk and msk to A II .
Phase 1: A II may adaptively make public key request queries. The challenger responds to these queries as outlined in Section III-B.
Challenge: A II outputs a message µ ∈ M. The challenger picks a random bit b ← {0, 1} and a random ciphertext c ← C. If b = 0, it sets the challenge ciphertext to c * 0 = Encrypt(mpk, id * , pk id * , µ). If b = 1, it sets the challenge ciphertext to c * 1 = c. The challenger sends c * b to A II . Phase 2: A II may continue to make the queries as described in Phase 1.
The CLFHE scheme is said to be INDr-sID-CPA secure against Type II attacks if Adv INDr−sID−CPA CLFHE,A II (λ) = negl(λ).
IV. A LEVELED CLFHE SCHEME IN THE RANDOM ORACLE MODEL A. CONSTRUCTION
The proposed leveled CLFHE scheme in the random oracle model is described as follows. Setup(1 λ , 1 L ): On input a security parameter λ and a circuit depth L, do:
The definitions of G and G −1 can also be found in [31] , [32] . 
3) Invoke the algorithm GenBasis
Output a public key pk id = (v, w) and a private key sk id = z. Encrypt(mpk, id, pk id , µ): On input an identity id ∈ {0, 1} * , a public key pk id , and a message µ ∈ {0, 1}, do:
Z,αq , and sample three noise vectors e 1 , e 2 , e 3 ← D N Z,αq . 4) Output a ciphertext C given below.
Decrypt(mpk, sk id , C): On input a private key sk id = z and a ciphertext C, do:
1) Let c be the penultimate column of C.
2) Output a message
Add(mpk, id, C 1 , C 2 ): On input two ciphertexts C 1 , C 2 under the same identity id, output
Mult(mpk, id, C 1 , C 2 ): On input two ciphertexts C 1 , C 2 under the same identity id, output
B. CORRECTNESS AND PARAMETER SELECTION
For a ciphertext C ← Encrypt(mpk, id, pk id , µ), we have
The error term is bounded by
The error terms are bounded by r T Add ≤ r T 1 + r T 2 and r T Mult ≤ N · r T 1 + r T 2 , respectively. If C 1 and C 2 are fresh ciphertexts, then the error terms are bounded by r T Add ≤ 2B and r T Mult ≤ (N + 1)B, respectively. By iteratively applying Add(mpk, id, C 1 , C 2 ) and Mult(mpk, id, C 1 , C 2 ), we can homomorphically compute
To work correctly, the scheme requires that:
• α ∈ (0, 1) and α ≥ 2 √ n/q. To satisfy the above requirements, we set the parameters (n, m, α, q, σ 1 , σ 2 ) as follows:
Here, we assume that δ is such that n δ > log q = O (L log n).
In addition, we observe that the evaluated ciphertext
. Therefore,
· log q 2 , where N = (2m+1)· log q . As a result, the proposed scheme enjoys the compactness.
C. SECURITY PROOF
Theorem 1: Suppose the hash function H is a random oracle. Then, the CLFHE scheme in Section IV-A is INDr-ID-CPA secure against Type I attacks provided that the DLWE n,q,χ assumption holds. Specifically, suppose there exists an attacker A I that wins the INDr-ID-CPA game defined in Section III-B with advantage Adv INDr−ID−CPA CLFHE,A I (λ), making at most Q r public key request queries and Q h hash queries to H , then there exists an algorithm that solves the DLWE n,q,χ problem with advantage Adv DLWE (λ), such that
Proof: We prove this theorem using a sequence of indistinguishable games. In Game i, we let Y i denote the event that the attacker wins the game, i.e., the event b = b .
Game 0. This game is the original INDr-ID-CPA game between an attacker A I attacking the CLFHE scheme and a challenger. By definition,
Game 1. Compared with Game 0, Game 1 makes two changes:
1) The challenger generates a guess h ← {0, 1} as to whether A I will request the partial private key for the target identity or not. We know that if A I requests the partial private key of the target identity, then it is not allowed to replace the public key of the target identity in Phase 1. Thus, if h = 0, then we assume that A I will request the partial private key of the target identity.
If h = 1, then we assume that A I does not request the partial private key of the target identity, and therefore it has the option of replacing the public key of the target identity in Phase 1. 2) We also change the conditions in which A I wins the game. Let Ext be the event that A I queries the partial private key on the target identity. The new conditions are as follows:
• If h = 0 and Ext occurs, then A I wins the game if b = b .
• If h = 0 and Ext does not occur, then A I wins the game with probability 1/2. (i.e., the value b is ignored and A I is assumed to have output a random guess for b.)
• If h = 1 and Ext occurs, then A I wins the game with probability 1/2. (as above)
• If h = 1 and Ext does not occur, then A I wins the
We note that
Consequently, we continue the game hopping in two different chains depending on the value of the guess h ∈ {0, 1}. Since the guess h is either 0 or 1 at any time, only one of these two chains will happen after Game 1.
The games under the guess h = 0 are as follows. Game 2. Compared with Game 1, Game 2 makes three changes:
1) In the setup phase, the challenger picks an index i ← [Q r ]. 2) On A I 's kth distinct query id k for a public key, assume without loss of generality that A I has not queried the partial private key on id k . If k = i, the challenger chooses v i ← Z n q at random, extracts the partial private key d i ← Extract(mpk, msk, id i ) and lets w i = W · d i mod q, and returns pk id i = (v i , w i ) to A I . Otherwise, the challenger extracts the partial private key d k ← Extract(mpk, msk, id k ), generates pk id k , sk id k ← KeyGen(mpk, id, d k ), and returns the public key pk id k to A I . 3) When A I produces a target identity id * and a message µ, assume without loss of generality that A I already queried the public key on id * . If id * = id i , the challenger aborts and outputs the symbol ⊥. Otherwise, the challenger sends the challenge ciphertext C * b to A I , where
By Corollary 5.4 in [21] , Game 2 is statistically indistinguishable from Game 1, provided that Game 2 has not aborted and output ⊥. Thus,
Game 3. In this game, the challenger changes the way in which the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is generated. The challenger chooses V ← Z m×N q and v i ← Z N q at random and sets the challenge ciphertext
Suppose A I has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing Game 2 from Game 3. We use A I to construct an algorithm B 1 to solve a DLWE n,q,χ problem instance
. To solve this instance using A I , B 1 simulates the challenger for A I as follows:
• In the setup phase, B 1 sets V = F. • On A I 's kth distinct query id k for a public key, B 1 does the following: if k = i, it lets v i = f, extracts the partial private key d i ← Extract(mpk, msk, id i ) and lets w i = W · d i mod q, and returns pk id i = (f, w i ) to A I . Otherwise, the challenger extracts the partial private key d k ← Extract(mpk, msk, id k ), generates pk id k , sk id k ← KeyGen(mpk, id, d k ), and returns the public key pk id k to A I .
• When A I produces a target identity id * and a message µ, B 1 does the following: if id * = id i , it aborts and outputs the symbol ⊥. Otherwise, it sends the challenge ciphertext C * b to A I , where
• B 1 is otherwise the same as the Game 2 challenger. • Finally, A I guesses whether the challenger that it is interacting with is the Game 2 challenger or the Game 3 challenger. B 1 outputs A I 's guess as the answer to the given DLWE instance. VOLUME 8, 2020 It can be seen that B 1 's advantage in solving the given DLWE instance is the same as A I 's advantage in distinguishing Game 2 from Game 3. Therefore,
Game 4. In this game, the challenger changes the way in which the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is generated. The challenger selects V i ← Z N q at random and sets the challenge ciphertext
Game 5. In this game, the challenger changes the way in which the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is generated. The challenger chooses W ← Z m×N q at random and sets the challenge ciphertext
Suppose A I has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing Game 4 from Game 5. We use A I to construct an algorithm B 2 to solve a DLWE n,q,χ problem instance (F, P) ∈ Z n×m q × Z m×N q . To solve this instance using A I , B 2 simulates the challenger for A I as follows:
• In the setup phase, B 2 sets W = F. • When A I produces a target identity id * and a message µ, B 2 does the following: if id * = id i , it aborts and outputs the symbol ⊥. Otherwise, it sends the challenge ciphertext C * b to A I , where
• B 2 is otherwise the same as the Game 4 challenger.
• Finally, A I guesses whether the challenger that it is interacting with is the Game 4 challenger or the Game 5 challenger. B 2 outputs A I 's guess as the answer to the given DLWE instance. It can be seen that B 2 's advantage in solving the given DLWE instance is the same as A I 's advantage in distinguishing Game 4 from Game 5. Therefore, Pr Y 4 − Pr Y 5 ≤ Adv DLWE,B 2 (λ). Game 6. In this game, the challenger changes the way in which the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is generated. The challenger selects W ← Z m×N q at random and sets the challenge ciphertext
In Game 5, W is uniformly random in Z m×N q ; hence, A T S 1 + E 1 + W is also uniformly random in Z m×N q . Therefore, Pr Y 5 − Pr Y 6 = negl(λ). Game 7. In this game, the challenger changes the way in which the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is generated. The challenger chooses the challenge ciphertext C * 0 ← Z (2m+1)×N q at random. In Game 6,
In addition, in Game 7, the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is chosen at random from Z (2m+1)×N q . Therefore,
The games under the guess h = 1 are as follows. Game 2 . Compared with Game 1, Game 2 makes six changes:
1) In the setup phase, the challenger picks an index j ← [Q h ]. 2) In the setup phase, the challenger generates A as a random matrix in Z n×m q . 3) On A I 's kth distinct hash query id k to H , the challenger does the following: If k = j, it chooses u j , w j ← Z n q at random, locally stores the tuple id j , u j , w j , ⊥ , and returns u j to A I . Otherwise, it samples d k ← D Z m ,σ 1 , lets u k = A · d k mod q and w k = W · d k mod q, locally stores the tuple (id k , u k , w k , d k ), and returns u k to A I . 4) When A I asks for a partial private key for the identity id, assume without loss of generality that A I already made the hash query on id. If id = id j , then the challenger aborts and outputs a random bit, i.e., A I wins the game with a probability of 1/2. Otherwise, the challenger retrieves the tuple (id, u, w, d) from local storage and returns d to A I . 5) When A I requests for a public key for the identity id, assume without loss of generality that A I already made the hash query on id. If id = id j , then the challenger samples a vector x j ← D Z m ,σ 2 and lets v j = V · x j mod q, retrieves the tuple id j , u j , w j , ⊥ from local storage, and returns pk id j = v j , w j to A I . Otherwise, the challenger samples a vector x ← D Z m ,σ 2 and lets v = V · x mod q, retrieves the tuple (id, u, w, d) from local storage, and returns pk id = (v, w) to A I . 6) When A I produces a target identity id * and a message µ, assume without loss of generality that A I already queried the public key on id * . If id * = id j , the challenger aborts and outputs the symbol ⊥. Otherwise, the challenger sends the challenge ciphertext C * b to A I , where
By Proposition 3, Game 2 is statistically indistinguishable from Game 1, provided that Game 2 has not aborted and output ⊥. Hence,
Game 3 . In this game, we change the way in which the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is created. The challenger chooses A ← Z m×N q and u j ← Z N q at random and sets the challenge ciphertext
Suppose A I has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing Game 2 from Game 3 . We use A I to construct an algorithm B 3 to solve a DLWE n,q,χ problem instance
. B 3 simulates the challenger for A I as follows:
• In the setup phase, B 3 sets A = F. • On A I 's kth distinct hash query id k to H , B 3 does the following: If k = j, it lets u j = f, chooses w j ← Z n q at random, locally stores the tuple id j , f, w j , ⊥ , and returns f to A I . Otherwise, it samples d k ← D Z m ,σ 1 , lets u k = A · d k mod q and w k = W · d k mod q, locally stores the tuple (id k , u k , w k , d k ), and returns u k to A I .
• When A I produces a target identity id * and a message µ, B 3 does the following: If id * = id j , it aborts and outputs the symbol ⊥. Otherwise, it sends the challenge ciphertext C * b to A I , where
• B 3 is otherwise the same as the Game 2 challenger.
• Finally, A I guesses whether the challenger it is interacting with is the Game 2 challenger or the Game 3 challenger. B 3 outputs A I 's guess as the answer to the given DLWE instance. It can be seen that the advantage of B 3 in solving the given DLWE instance is the same as that of A I in distinguishing Game 2 from Game 3 . Therefore,
Game 4 . In this game, we change the way in which the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is created. The challenger chooses A ← Z m×N q and u j ← Z N q at random and sets the challenge ciphertext
In Game 3 , A and 
Game 5 . In this game, we change the way in which the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is created. The challenger chooses V ← Z m×N q at random and sets the challenge ciphertext
Suppose A I has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing Game 4 from Game 5 . We use A I to construct an algorithm B 4 to solve a DLWE n,q,χ problem instance (F, P) ∈ Z n×m q ×Z m×N q . B 4 simulates the challenger for A I as follows:
• In the setup phase, B 4 sets V = F. • When A I produces a target identity id * and a message µ, B 4 does the following: If id * = id j , it aborts and outputs the symbol ⊥. Otherwise, it sends the challenge ciphertext C * b to A I , where
• B 4 is otherwise the same as the Game 4 challenger.
• Finally, A I guesses whether the challenger it is interacting with is the Game 4 challenger or the Game 5 challenger. B 4 outputs A I 's guess as the answer to the given DLWE instance. It can be seen that the advantage of B 4 in solving the given DLWE instance is the same as that of A I in distinguishing Game 4 from Game 5 . Therefore, Pr Y 4 − Pr Y 5 ≤ Adv DLWE,B 4 (λ). Game 6 . In this game, we change the way in which the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is created. The challenger chooses the challenge ciphertext C * 0 ← Z (2m+1)×N q at random. VOLUME 8, 2020 In Game 5 ,
In Game 6 , the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is chosen at random from Z (2m+1)×N q . Thus,
In summary, we obtain that
where Adv DLWE (λ) = max Adv DLWE,B i (λ) i∈ [4] .
Theorem 2: Suppose the hash function H is a random oracle. Then, the CLFHE scheme in Section IV-A is INDr-ID-CPA secure against Type II attacks assuming that the DLWE n,q,χ assumption holds. In particular, suppose there exists an attacker A II that wins the INDr-ID-CPA game defined in Section III-B with advantage Adv INDr−ID−CPA CLFHE,A II (λ), making at most Q r public key request queries, then there exists an algorithm that solves the DLWE n,q,χ problem with advantage Adv DLWE (λ), such that
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to that of Theorem 1 under the guess h = 0. As a result, we omit a detailed proof of Theorem 2 here.
V. A LEVELED CLFHE SCHEME IN THE STANDARD MODEL A. CONSTRUCTION
The proposed leveled CLFHE scheme in the standard model is described as follows.
Setup(1 λ , 1 L ): On input a security parameter λ and a circuit depth L, do: 1) Set the parameters n = n(λ, L), m = m(λ, L), α = α(λ, L), q = q(λ, L), σ 1 = σ 1 (λ, L), and σ 2 = σ 2 (λ, L) as specified in Section V-B below.
2) Define the gadget matrix
, 1} N ×N that expands each entry a ∈ Z q of the input matrix into a vector a 0 , . . . , a log q −1 T , where a i is the ith bit in a's binary representation. For any matrix X ∈ Z (3m+1)×N q , it is clear that G · G −1 (X) = X. The definitions of G and G −1 can also be found in [31] , [32] .
3) Invoke the algorithm GenBasis (1 n , 1 m , q) to generate a random matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and a basis T A for ⊥ (A) such that T A ≤ O( √ n log q). 4) Select three matrices A 1 , B, V ← Z n×m q at random, select a matrix W ← Z n×2m q at random, and select a vector u ← Z n q at random. 5) Choose a function H : Z n q → Z n×n q which is an encoding with full-rank differences as defined in [22] . 6) Output a master public key and a master private key: mpk = A, A 1 , B, V, W, u, H and msk = T A . Extract(mpk, msk, id): On input a master private key msk and an identity id ∈ Z n q , do: 1) Invoke the algorithm SampleLeft(A, ∈ Z 3m+1 . 5) Output a public key pk id = (v, w) and a private key sk id = z. Encrypt(mpk, id, pk id , µ): On input an identity id ∈ Z n q , a public key pk id , and a message µ ∈ {0, 1}, do:
Z,αq and E 3 ← D 2m×N Z,αq , and sample three noise vectors e 1 , e 2 , e 3 ← D N Z,αq . 5) Output a ciphertext C given by
Decrypt(mpk, sk id , C): On input a private key sk id = z and a ciphertext C, do: 1) Let c be the penultimate column of C.
B. CORRECTNESS AND PARAMETER SELECTION
The error term is bounded by To work correctly, the scheme requires that:
2)σ 1 m + σ 2 m + 3 αq;
• α ∈ (0, 1) and α ≥ 2 √ n/q.
To satisfy the requirements, we set the parameters (n, m, α, q, σ 1 , σ 2 ) as follows:
· ω( log n) 2 , σ 2 = ω( log n).
Here we assume that δ is such that n δ > log q = O (L log n).
. Hence,
where N = (3m + 1) · log q . Consequently, the proposed scheme satisfies the compactness requirement. Proof: We prove this theorem via a series of indistinguishable games. In Game i, we let Y i denote the event that the attacker wins the game, i.e., the event b = b . Game 0. This game is the original INDr-sID-CPA game between an attacker A I in attacking our CLFHE scheme and a challenger. By definition,
Game 1. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, In Game 1 we also introduce a guess h ← {0, 1} and change the conditions in which A I wins the game. Thus, we obtain
The games in the case of the guess h = 0 are as follows. Game 2. In this game, the challenger changes the way to answer the public key request queries. When A I asks for a public key for the identity id, assume that A I has not queried the partial private key on id. If id = id * , the challenger chooses v id * ← Z n q at random, extracts d * ← Extract(mpk, msk, id * ) and lets w id * = W · d * mod q, and returns pk id * = (v id * , w id * ) to A I . Otherwise, the challenger extracts d ← Extract(mpk, msk, id), generates (pk id , sk id ) ← KeyGen(mpk, id, d), and returns pk id to A I . By Corollary 5.4 in [21] , Game 2 is statistically indistinguishable from Game 1. Hence,
Game 3. In this game, the challenger changes the way in which the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is generated. The challenger selects V ← Z m×N q and v id * ← Z N q at random and sets the challenge ciphertext
. B 1 simulates the challenger for A I using the following way: B 1 sets V = F, sets v id * = f, and sets the challenge ciphertext
It can be seen that the advantage of B 1 in solving the given DLWE problem instance is the same as that of A I in distinguishing Game 2 from Game 3. Therefore,
Game 4. In this game, the challenger changes the way in which the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is generated. The challenger selects v id * ← Z N q at random and sets the challenge ciphertext
Game 5. In this game, the challenger changes the way in which the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is generated. The challenger selects W ← Z 2m×N q at random and sets the challenge ciphertext
Suppose A I has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing Game 4 from Game 5. We use A I to construct an algorithm B 2 to solve a DLWE n,q,χ problem instance (F, P) ∈ Z n×2m q × Z 2m×N q . B 2 simulates the challenger for A I in the following way: B 2 sets W = F and sets the challenge ciphertext
It can be seen that the advantage of B 2 in solving the given DLWE problem instance is the same as that of A I in distinguishing Game 4 from Game 5. Therefore,
Game 6. In this game, the challenger changes the way in which the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is generated. The challenger selects W ← Z 2m×N q at random and sets the challenge ciphertext
In Game 5, W is uniformly random in Z 2m×N
Game 7. In this game, the challenger changes the way in which the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is generated. The challenger selects the challenge ciphertext C * 0 ← Z (3m+1)×N q at random. In Game 6,
In Game 7,
The games in the case of the guess h = 1 are as follows. Game 2 . Compared with Game 1, Game 2 makes two changes:
1) At the setup phase, the challenger samples R ← D m×m Z,ω( √ log m) . Notice that the challenger will use R to generate the challenge ciphertext C * 0 in the challenge phase.
2) At the setup phase, the challenger constructs A 1 as
In this way, we obtain By the leftover hash lemma [33] , [34] , we obtain 
where B = (H (id) − H (id * )) · B, and returns d to A I . Note that A id · d = u mod q and d is distributed as D u q (A id ),σ 1 by Proposition 5. 4) When A I asks for a public key for the identity id, the challenger does the following: If id = id * , it samples x * ← D Z m ,σ 2 and lets v id * = V · x * mod q, chooses w id * ← Z n q at random, and returns pk id * = (v id * , w id * ) to A I . Otherwise for id = id * , assume that A I has not queried the partial private key on id. It samples d ← SampleRight A, B , R, T B , u, σ 1 where B = (H (id) − H (id * )) · B, generates (pk id , sk id ) ← KeyGen(mpk, id, d), and returns pk id to A I .
Since σ 1 used in the scheme is sufficiently large, Game 3 is statistically indistinguishable from Game 2 . Therefore,
Game 4 . In this game, we change the way in which the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is generated. The challenger selects A id * ← Z 2m×N q and u ← Z N q at random and sets the challenge ciphertext
Suppose A I has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing Game 3 from Game 4 . We use A I to construct an algorithm B 3 to solve a DLWE n,q,χ problem instance
. B 3 simulates the challenger for A I as follows: B 3 sets A = F and u = f, sets P id * = P R T ·P , and sets the challenge ciphertext
When F, f , P p T ← A S,χ where the secret S ∈ Z n×N q , it can be observed that
Thus, C * 0 is distributed exactly as in Game 3 . When F, f , P p T is chosen from the uniform distribution over
, we obtain that P id * is uniform in Z 2m×N q by the leftover hash lemma [33] , [34] , and that p is uniform in Z N q . Consequently, C * 0 is distributed exactly as in Game 4 . Hence, the advantage of B 3 in solving the given DLWE problem instance is the same as that of A I in distinguishing Game 3 from Game 4 . Therefore,
Game 5 . In this game, we change the way in which the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is created. The challenger selects A id * ← Z 2m×N q and u ← Z N q at random and sets the challenge ciphertext
In Game 4 , A id * and u T are uniformly random in Z 2m×N q and Z 1×N q , respectively; hence, A id * + W T S 3 + E 3 and u T + v T id * S 2 + e T 2 + w T id * S 3 + e T 3 are also uniformly random in Z 2m×N q and Z 1×N q , respectively. Therefore, Pr Y 4 − Pr Y 5 = negl(λ). Game 6 . In this game, we change the way in which the challenge ciphertext C * 0 is generated. The challenger selects V ← Z m×N q at random and sets the challenge ciphertex
Suppose A I has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing Game 5 from Game 6 . We use A I to construct an algorithm B 4 to solve a DLWE n,q,χ problem instance Clearly, the advantage of B 4 in solving the given DLWE problem instance is the same as that of A I in distinguishing Game 5 from Game 6 . Therefore, Pr Y 5 − Pr Y 6 ≤ Adv DLWE,B 4 (λ). where Adv DLWE (λ) = max Adv DLWE,B i (λ) i∈ [4] .
Theorem 4: The CLFHE scheme in Section V-A is INDr-sID-CPA secure against Type II attacks if the DLWE n,q,χ assumption holds. In particular, suppose there exists an attacker A II that wins the INDr-sID-CPA game defined in Section III-C with an advantage Adv INDr−sID−CPA CLFHE,A II (λ), then there exists an algorithm that solves the DLWE n,q,χ problem with an advantage Adv DLWE (λ) such that Adv INDr−sID−CPA CLFHE,A II (λ) ≤ 2 · Adv DLWE (λ) + negl(λ).
The proof of Theorem 4 is similar to that of Theorem 3 in the case of the guess h = 0. Thus, we omit the detailed proof of Theorem 4 here.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Based on the LWE problem, we constructed two leveled CLFHE schemes, one in the random oracle model and the other in the standard model. Our future work includes the following:
1) The ring-LWE problem [35] is an algebraic variant of the LWE problem. In general, CLFHE schemes based on the ring-LWE problem have much better performance than schemes based on the LWE problem. Thus, we will construct leveled CLFHE schemes based on the ring-LWE problem. 2) Several chosen-ciphertext secure FHE schemes [36] - [38] have been proposed. An otherwise secure CLFHE scheme may be defeated under a chosen-ciphertext attack. Therefore, we will construct chosen-ciphertext secure leveled CLFHE schemes based on the LWE problem. 3) Multi-key FHE [39] allows homomorphic computation on data encrypted under different keys. Multi-key FHE schemes [40] - [42] and multi-key identity-based FHE schemes [43] , [44] have been proposed. We will design multi-key certificateless FHE schemes. 4) Proxy re-encryption (PRE) [45] is an extension of public-key encryption. Homomorphic proxy re-encryption (HPRE) schemes [46] , [47] and identity-based HPRE schemes [48] have been proposed. We will design certificateless HPRE schemes.
